SINGAPORE: China’s anti-corruption campaign within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has just got more intriguing.
Over a week after a media report that he was under disciplinary investigations, Defence Minister Dong Jun reappeared in public on Thursday (Dec 5), on the same day state media reported President Xi Jinping’s speech at a PLA event urging the military to “combat corruption”.
But analysts tell CNA his reappearance doesn’t quite quell the speculation over his fate, nor that of his former boss Miao Hua, a member of the apex Central Military Commission (CMC), who has been suspended from duties due to a disciplinary probe.
Some say the latest developments also raise questions over Mr Xi’s grip on power within the China’s Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA, as well as the military’s readiness in the event of a potential Taiwan Strait conflict, and its ability to stay on course for ambitious longer-term goals of military modernisation.
DONG JUN STILL IN TROUBLE?
The Financial Times first reported on Nov 27 that Mr Dong was under investigation for alleged corruption, citing current and former US ministers among its sources. The Chinese foreign ministry later shot down the report, dismissing it as “shadow chasing”.
Mr Dong’s alleged downfall had fuelled much interest and was widely reported by international media outlets, given how his two predecessors – Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe – were both removed for “serious violations of discipline”, a known euphemism for corruption.
While his attendance at a security forum on the Gulf of Guinea held in Shanghai, as reported by the official Xinhua news agency, could signal that he is not under investigation, analysts say there could be more than meets the eye.
Observer Lyle Morris, senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, said: “It could signify that (Dong Jun) is not under investigation. Or it could be an internal decision by the CCP to demonstrate continuity while investigations remain ongoing.
“As you know, the FT based its report of his investigation on anonymous US sources. In other words, the US sources got out ahead of China’s news cycle… China could be biding their time until a decision is made about Dong Jun’s fate.”
Analysts say it might be too soon to confirm whether Mr Dong is safe or still in trouble.
They cite how he does not wield the same power as his two predecessors who held concurrent roles as CMC members and state councilors, granting them direct access to Mr Xi and Premier Li Qiang respectively. Mr Dong holds neither of these titles.
Also, what remains unexplained are Mr Dong’s absence at recent official engagements usually attended by a defence minister.
Prior to his appearance on Dec 5, Mr Dong’s last public appearance was on Nov 21, when he gave a speech at a meeting of Association of Southeast Asian Nations defence ministers in Vientiane, Laos.
But he declined to meet US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on the sidelines, citing US actions over Taiwan – a move that the Pentagon chief said was unfortunate. Mr Dong’s absence from a visit to China by Singapore’s Chief of Defence Force Aaron Beng days later also sparked speculation.
While Mr Dong’s reappearance may prove that he is safe for now, observers say it depends also on his role in the investigation surrounding Mr Miao.
Former investigative journalist-turned-commentator Cai Shenkun asserted in a Nov 11 post on social media platform X that “since Admiral Dong Jun was promoted by Miao”, he will be “affected”.
Dr Willy Lam, senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, cited talk that Mr Dong may have dodged disgrace because he “spilled the beans on Miao Hua” as a witness.
“It is likely that Dong Jun would carry on for a few months just for the sake of appearances,” Dr Lam told CNA. “The fact that Dong Jun reappeared, this has added an intriguing element to the story.”
“For now, it seems his political future remains secure,” said Mr Chen Shih-min, associate professor in the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University, who signalled that his safety could possibly solidify, if he fills the vacuum in the CMC, as a member.
MIAO HUA: PAWN IN POWER STRUGGLE?
Even though Mr Miao is confirmed to be in trouble, his public removal in itself has raised eyebrows among observers, who cited how the language used around his case differed from the usual practice.
Defence ministry spokesman Wu Qian told a press briefing on Nov 28 that the CCP “has decided to suspend Miao Hua from duty pending investigation”, without giving further details about the charges against him.
Some analysts pointed out how in announcing Mr Miao’s suspension, the Chinese term jiancha (“inspection”) was used instead of diaocha (“investigation”).
“If they use the formal term diaocha, it means more likely than not, according to the Chinese legal system, that he is already found guilty.” Jiancha, however, is a “lighter term,” implying that Mr Miao “might not necessarily be given a long, severe jail term,” said Dr Lam.
National Taiwan University’s Mr Chen added: “Of course, it can also be interpreted as a relatively lenient treatment of Miao Hua, and the reason for this could certainly be explained by the fact that Miao Hua is ‘one of Xi Jinping’s truly close allies.’”
But lightening the terminology might not change the fate for Mr Miao, said Mr Morris, pointing out that the announcement in English said it was over a suspected “serious violation of discipline”.
“For China to come out publicly to announce that Miao Hua is suspended from duty is a strong enough indication that his career is over and will be under house arrest or worse,” he added.
Opinions are also divided over whether Mr Miao’s suspension is the work of Mr Xi or that of opposing factions against the president.
According to a report published on Nov 28 by China Maritime Studies Institute, Mr Miao’s suspension “suggests Xi, or others, may have wanted to make his removal an example for the PLA.”
But Dr Lam noted that there are figures within the military that could have sanctioned Mr Miao’s disciplinary probe to “weaken President Xi’s power base” and “diminish” his influence.
“Miao Hua was such an important pawn in the jigsaw puzzle, in the power struggle,” Dr Lam explained, adding that he had the powers to promote and dismiss personnel.
Mr Miao’s rise to top military post also reportedly stems from his ties to Mr Xi, harking back to the 1990s, when both served in Fujian province.
Analysts have described him as a “close ally” and “trusted interlocutor” of the president, whose career rose as part of the “Fujian clique” – referring to a group of Chinese politicians closely allied with the leader.
In the CMC, Mr Miao held a critical position as the head of its Political Work Department (PWD), responsible for senior personnel promotions and ensuring ideological conformity within the PLA.
But despite being widely seen as a close protégé of the Chinese supremo, Mr Miao’s career trajectory showed signs of stagnation.
“Miao Hua’s problems started much earlier and possibly explain why he was not promoted to become one of the CMC vice-chairmen in October 2022,” explains Mr James Char, assistant professor at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).
MIAO HUA’S CAREER PROGRESSION
- Born in November 1955 in Fuzhou, Fujian Province, Miao Hua enlisted in the PLA in December 1969. He served in various political commissar roles within the Nanjing Military Region, eventually becoming the Director of the Political Department of the 31st Group Army in August 1999.
- In December 2010, Mr Miao was appointed Director of the Political Department of the Lanzhou Military Region. By July 2014, he had risen to the position of Political Commissar of the same military region.
- In December 2014, Mr Miao made an unusual transition from the army to the navy, becoming the Political Commissar of the PLA Navy. This move was significant, as such positions were typically filled by officers with naval backgrounds.
- In October 2017, Mr Miao was appointed Director of the Political Work Department of the CMC, placing him among the top echelons of China’s military leadership.
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NAVY’S HOUSE CLEANING?
Analysts say the anti-graft drive in the PLA could also reflect a strategy to reshape the leadership of China’s military forces by targeting powerful figures in key branches like the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and PLA Navy (PLAN).
Reports indicate Mr Xi has purged around 65 senior PLA officers – including generals, commissars, and commanders – since assuming leadership in 2012. Mr Miao is the seventh CMC member to be impacted since then.
Over the past two years alone, senior figures linked with the PLARF, such as Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, as well as senior officials Li Yuchao, Xu Zhongbo, Zhou Yaning, and Lu Hong, have been implicated.
Former PLAN Lieutenant Colonel Yao Cheng stated on social media that current PLAN Political Commissar Admiral Yuan Huazhi and his predecessor Admiral Qin Shengxiang are also rumored to be facing scrutiny.
Admiral Yuan Huazhi was promoted during Mr Miao’s tenure as PLAN Political Commissar from 2014 to 2017, and was last reported to be seen at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao in April 2024.
Since then, there have been no public reports of Admiral Yuan’s attendance at official meetings or events.
“If these actions are verified against the individuals named, then indeed it reinforces the idea that the navy is possibly under the microscope for violations,” said Dr Lim Tai Wei, East Asian expert and professor at Soka University.
Mr Morris added that “it’s safe to say at this point that all of Miao’s patronage networks are at risk of being persecuted, including in the PLAN.”
IMPACT ON XI’S AUTHORITY
Another question raised is how Beijing’s reinforced clampdown on graft in the armed forces affects Mr Xi’s grip on power.
On one hand, analysts say they showcase his unchallenged power over the military. Dr Lim argues that he has “greatly solidified (his) authority over the party, officialdom, and military systems, so the latest incidents may not have a significant impact.”
Similarly, Mr Morris stated: “It reflects Xi’s power of authority because he is able to continue his anti-corruption campaign with little discernible pushback.”
On the other hand, the removal of officials handpicked by the president might lead some to ask if it was either misjudgement or deeper tensions in a power struggle.
“Miao Hua is a typical ‘Xi Jinping loyalist’, a significant military figure promoted by Xi himself,” noted Mr Chen, adding that “the high-profile and humiliating announcement of his investigation, regardless of the reasons or outcomes, will severely damage Xi Jinping’s reputation.”
“All these pieces of evidence show that Xi Jinping’s grip over the top brass and therefore over the entire PLA has become more and more shaky,” said Dr Lam.
Trust and morale within the PLA could be strained, as Dr Lam observed, “Morale is extremely low because nobody knows whether he will still be alive or whether he will still be able to report to work the next day.”
FIGHTING READINESS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Observers say the downfall of Mr Miao also raises eyebrows because of the navy’s central role in China’s military goals in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
The purge also comes as China is trying to achieve its goals of modernising the military by 2027, and building a world-class military by 2050.
Referring to the 2027 timeline set for the “Centennial Military Building Goal”, Dr Andrew S Erickson, an associate professor at the Naval War College, said it is a capabilities development deadline that requires China’s armed forces “to give Xi a full toolbox of military operational options against Taiwan by 2027”.
The year 2027 also coincides with the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which analysts have said the Chinese supremo could be using to push for a possible fourth term.
Speaking to soldiers on Dec 5, Mr Xi said the military should “combat corruption to ensure the absolute loyalty, purity, and reliability of the force”, and that it had to “focus on capabilities to fight and win wars”.
But National Taiwan University’s Mr Chen said internal instability might make the Chinese leader “hesitant to delegate military authority to commanders for waging war”, though other factors such as economic and social instability could come into play.
“China is currently facing severe economic and social challenges, and Xi seems unsure how to resolve them. If these issues remain unresolved, Xi would lack the legitimacy for a fourth term, hence raising concerns that he might use external military actions to divert domestic attention, incite nationalism, and strengthen his authority,” he added.
Mr Morris believes that corruption in the PLA “will have some degree of influence over the 2027 timeline”, adding that these investigations “all affect morale and readiness” and could hinder China’s ability to project power in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea.
But despite these challenges, Dr Erickson argued they are unlikely to derail China’s military plans.
“Politicised corruption investigations impact and impose costs on China’s military… but are fundamentally a speed bump, not a showstopper”.
“Xi has his foot firmly on the accelerator and a full tank of gas. That is the larger story which we lose sight of at our peril,” he told CNA.