LONDON: To ring in the new year, China’s homegrown jet, the C919 – nicknamed “daifeiji”, or “Great Airplane” – took its first regularly scheduled passenger flight outside the Chinese mainland.
The new daily route, linking Shanghai Hongqiao and Hong Kong, has been hailed by Beijing as a landmark milestone in showcasing the C919 to the world. Until now, the aircraft had flown exclusively on domestic routes operated by Chinese state-owned airlines.
At first glance, this flight seems momentous. Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, maintains its own aviation authority and adheres to regulations distinct from those on the mainland. Hong Kong International Airport, which lacks a domestic terminal, classifies all flights as international. In technical terms, the C919’s Hong Kong route marks its first international foray.
But how significant is this milestone? In truth, it is modest at best.
The C919 has yet to secure airworthiness certifications from either America’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), two authorities whose approvals are essential for entry into global markets. The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) has pledged to work closely with EASA on certification, but progress has been slow.
Without these stamps of approval, the aircraft’s market appeal remains limited and its journey to Hong Kong does little to change that.
HIGH STAKES
True milestones for the C919 lie further ahead: Securing certification from both the FAA and EASA, and seeing the aircraft purchased and operated by foreign airlines on international routes that bypass China entirely. Imagine a C919 shuttling between Singapore and Jakarta, or Mumbai and Dubai. Such a flight would signify the C919’s emergence as a genuine global competitor.
The stakes are high. But for all its fanfare, the C919 is not the ultimate goal for Beijing. As I argued in an earlier article for The Interpreter, the jet’s significance lies not just in its engineering but as a tool for diplomacy and national prestige under Xi Jinping.
The C919 made its high-profile international showcase at the Singapore Air Show, where China’s Tibet Airlines announced an order for 40 C919 planes. In fact, orders for the aircraft have been confined to Chinese-owned airlines. These purchases are widely seen as state-directed rather than market-driven, a reality that has dampened the jet’s international allure.
The C919’s limited appeal stems in part from its reliance on Western components. Despite being labelled a “Chinese-made” or “homegrown” jet, many of its critical parts – including avionics and engines – are sourced from Western manufacturers. Some sceptics even suggest that the aircraft’s design borrows heavily from Boeing’s 737 programme, with accusations of intellectual property theft lingering in the background.
Yet Beijing’s ambitions extend well beyond the C919, as they did beyond the ARJ21, China’s first serious attempt at commercial jet manufacturing. The ARJ21 was born out of a troubled partnership in the 1980s with McDonnell Douglas, a major American aircraft manufacturer at the time, when China sought to develop its aviation industry by co-producing the MD-80 series.
The joint venture ultimately collapsed, leaving China with outdated designs and some technological know-how. The ARJ21, heavily derived from the MD-80, retained a 1980s airframe and struggled to meet modern performance standards, limiting its appeal even domestically.
SUBSTANTIVE COMPETITION
The C919, by contrast, was marketed as a shift from this joint-venture legacy. It is China’s first major attempt to build a jetliner designed for global competitiveness, incorporating contemporary engineering and the ARJ21’s lessons. The C919 has become a testing ground of sorts for China’s aerospace capabilities and marketing acumen.
Nor is the C919 the sum of China’s ambition. A widebody C929 project was initially envisioned as a joint venture with Russia, only to stall following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China subsequently took full control, and should it succeed, it could solidify China’s position in the global aviation industry – moving from symbolic milestones to substantive competition.
The C929 was envisioned as a direct competitor to Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner and Airbus’s A350, flagship models in the widebody market and symbols of Western aircraft manufacturing dominance. Unlike the single-aisle C919, the C929 is designed for long-haul flights and capable of carrying more passengers.
Initially, the C929 was to feature engines from Western manufacturers such as Rolls-Royce or General Electric. Beijing is now doubling down on efforts to develop the CJ-2000 engine, a domestically produced alternative.
If successful, this would make the C929 more homegrown of a jet than the C919, reducing China’s reliance on Western technology.
Aircraft manufacturing is a high-value, high-skill industry that supports thousands of jobs and is a source of national prestige for major economic powers. The United States and the European Union have long supported their respective aerospace champions, Boeing and Airbus, while smaller manufacturers such as Brazil’s Embraer and Canada’s Bombardier also benefit from state backing.
For Beijing, establishing a competitive aerospace industry is both an economic goal and a geopolitical imperative.
The success of the C919 and the C929 is also tied to China’s extensive investment in its connectivity infrastructure. The country has poured billions into building new airports and upgrading existing facilities, creating a robust domestic market for homegrown jets. The state-owned flag carrier Air China, which operates President Xi Jinping’s international flights, has already been announced as the C929’s launch customer.
While international adoption may be slow, Beijing expects – in both anticipative and directive meanings of the word – Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (better known as COMAC) jets to dominate within China while awaiting eventual global expansion in the near future.
Kazimier Lim is an MPhil/PhD scholar at the LSE Department of International Relations. This commentary first appeared on Lowy Institute’s blog, The Interpreter.