Commentary: What’s Israel’s endgame in Lebanon?

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BIRMINGHAM: Bloodied, humiliated and vulnerable after two days of deadly explosions targeting pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah operatives, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Iran-backed militia, on Thursday (Sep 19) said the attacks amounted to a “declaration of war” against the people of Lebanon.

Hezbollah has blamed Israel for the attacks and vowed to retaliate. Israel has not claimed responsibility for the coordinated mass explosions, although Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on Wednesday declared the start of a “new phase” of the Gaza war.

Even as Mr Nasrallah gave his speech, low-flying Israeli fighter jets targeted the Lebanese capital, setting off a series of sonic booms.

Suffice to say, fears of an all-out Israel-Lebanon conflict are growing.

UNPRECEDENTED BLOW

The number of people killed in the attacks on Tuesday and Wednesday currently stands at more than three dozen, while around 3,000 are injured, including several hundred with serious and potentially life-threatening wounds.

These attacks, however, were arguably less about killing members of Hezbollah. Their primary aim most likely was to disrupt Hezbollah’s communication networks and cause lasting damage to its command-and-control structures.

Hezbollah previously switched from mobile phones to pagers in order to avoid interception and tracking. After the first wave of attacks on Tuesday, the militia group was left only with relatively short-range two-way radio devices, which were disabled the following day. This now leaves the organisation with few options besides human messengers to maintain communication and coordinate any kind of response.

What this response will be is unclear for now. In part, it will be determined by Israel’s next steps.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s war Cabinet recently approved new war aims that include the return of tens of thousands of displaced Israelis to areas in the north of the country along the borders with Lebanon and Syria from where they fled because of Hezbollah’s escalation of missile attacks following Hamas attacks against Israel on Oct 7 last year.

Mr Netanyahu and Mr Gallant subsequently doubled down on this shift from the conflict with Hamas to an impending all-out war with Hezbollah. The strikes aimed at the group’s communication networks over the past two days could give Israel an important advantage in any ground war, especially if it is launched soon.

But the risks in doing so are formidable, and they are certainly more significant than in the case of the war in Gaza. That war was launched in response to the unprecedented scale and cruelty of the Hamas attacks last October, and Israel’s crucial Western partners have stood by the country’s right to self-defence. This support has waned among governments, and even more so among the Western public.

No similar sympathies, however, exist in relation to a possible war between Israel and Hezbollah. If Israel were to embark on a ground incursion of Lebanon, it is highly likely that remaining support for the country would further erode.

ISRAEL HAS A CHOICE TO MAKE

First, the tit-for-tat escalation between these two long-standing foes significantly picked up over the last several months with Israeli assassinations of senior Hezbollah (and Hamas) operatives and intensifying cross-border missile attacks and air strikes.

Some 60,000 Israeli citizens have been displaced on that side of the border, around 100,000 on the other side. In addition, the damage to mostly civilian infrastructure – houses, schools, shops, water supplies, the electricity grid – is also substantial, especially in southern Lebanon.

Any further escalation would simply lead to more human suffering, and, given the experiences of Gaza, a deliberate choice by the Israeli government to embark on such a course of action is hardly likely to persuade Western leaders that they should spend additional political and financial capital on supporting Mr Netanyahu.

Much like the inconclusive 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, any new ground offensive by Israeli forces into Lebanon would be a war of choice, and arguably one for the purpose of prolonging Mr Netanyahu’s political survival.

What’s more, today’s Hezbollah is a far more potent adversary than it was nearly two decades ago when it managed to fight Israeli forces to a stalemate. Its links with its main backer, Iran, are more solid, and have enabled the group to build up a significant arsenal of sophisticated weapons that, if deployed en masse, could easily overwhelm Israel’s air defences and cause substantial casualties and damage to military and civilian infrastructure.

The so-called axis of resistance, controlled by Tehran, could additionally renew its efforts not only to target Israel but also the interests of its Western allies in the region and beyond.

Therefore, an Israeli choice of escalation, and especially one that carries significant risks of both an inconclusive outcome of the war with Hezbollah and of a wider regional escalation that the West has worked hard to avoid over the past eleven and a half months since Oct 7, is unlikely to lead to sustained, let alone increased, support for Israel.

RISKS OF AN ALL-OUT WAR

As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken made clear during his visit to Cairo, which coincided with the pager and walkie-talkie attacks, such events make efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza and a release of the remaining hostages held by Hamas for almost a year now, once again less likely.

This is not only a tragedy for the people of Gaza and for the hostages and their families. It also increases the political polarisation inside Israel, something that, for now, has ensured that Mr Netanyahu can hold on to power.

Critically, part of the price the Israeli prime minister has been willing to pay to secure his place in office has been the empowerment and emboldening of extremist political forces in Israel itself.

This has not only eroded Western support, but it has also strengthened the position of Iran as the increasingly pivotal regional power. As Israel drifts away further and further from being democracy, the Middle East drifts closer to the abyss of all-out war and all-out authoritarianism.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies.