In Vietnam’s ‘game of thrones’, is China the only constant?

Vietnam may have another new captain at the helm, but the ship of state is charting a familiar trajectory when it comes to China, analysts say.

Though police general To Lam, who was sworn in as president on May 22, previously sought Beijing’s advice on shoring up domestic security, foreign-policy experts believe Hanoi will stay the course in its dealings with its powerful northern neighbour.

Lam, Vietnam’s former chief of public security, took office amid a major leadership reshuffle that also saw the country’s parliament elect a new chairman.

Two state presidents and the parliament speaker have now stepped down within 18 months, in a series of high-profile departures linked to unspecified “wrongdoing” as a sweeping anti-corruption crackdown upends the one-party state’s typically staid politics.

Lam, 66, replaced Vo Van Thuong, who stepped down in March after being accused of violating party rules – just over a year after taking office.

Despite recently upgrading ties with the United States, Japan and Australia, Vietnam has mostly kept its relations with China on an even keel. During a state visit in December by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the two countries pledged to “open a new stage” in bilateral relations and step up cooperation.

Huynh Tam Sang, an international-relations lecturer at Vietnam’s University of Social Sciences and Humanities, said it was not in Hanoi’s best interests to alter its foreign-policy trajectory.

“The country’s current approach is likely to remain unchanged,” he said, adding that Hanoi’s foreign policy was decided based on consultations between members of the ruling Communist Party’s Politburo “instead of relying on any top figures [individually]”.

“Vietnam will continue to hedge among great powers,” Huynh said, referring to Hanoi’s foreign policy approach that Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong first termed “bamboo diplomacy” in 2021.

Evoking the strong roots, stout trunk and flexible branches of the bamboo plant, the term describes Vietnam’s nuanced strategy to navigate geopolitics: preserving its independence and benefiting from multiple international partnerships without becoming beholden to any one power.

Security advice

Vietnam’s newly-elected president visited China in September last year, during which his Ministry of Public Security picked up “a lot of tactics” – most notably in counterterrorism and anti-riot measures – from its Chinese counterpart, according to Huynh. Monitoring dissent and the surveillance of activists are two of the ministry’s main roles.

Huynh said Lam had also asked for “both theoretical and practical advice” from China’s security chiefs on how to keep Vietnam’s Communist Party “in complete control over authority and leadership” back in January.

“Chinese officials know they can rely on Lam because of his symbiotic comradeship with General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, who has attempted to maintain close ties with Chinese President Xi Jinping.” he said.

Vietnam’s leadership has “always viewed the world through a similar lens as China’s”, said Zachary Abuza, a professor of security strategy at the National War College in Washington.

“They fear ‘colour revolutions’, their policy priority is always regime survival, they equate regime security with national security,” he said, referring to a series of pro-democracy uprisings that swept several former Soviet states in the early 2000s.

Abuza, who is also an adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University, said the prevalence of public security officials in Vietnam’s 12-member Politburo – at least five, including Lam – and a broad-ranging directive it reportedly issued last year warning of “hostile and reactionary forces” pointed to growing insecurity among the ruling elite.

Directive 24, a copy of which was obtained by regional human rights activists, supposedly contains dire warnings about the threat posed to national security from Vietnam’s growing international ties.

“We are definitely seeing the Communist Party of Vietnam adopt many Chinese instruments of maintaining regime survival,” Abuza said.

“Hanoi does learn from Beijing, whether in cybersecurity laws, the use of tax laws to target regime opponents, or extrajudicial renditions.”

But he said Vietnam would continue to balance ties with the US and China as it needed both economically while it struggled with problems such as an insufficient power supply and infrastructure weakness.

“Vietnam is very much dependent on being integrated into the global economy and has been a huge beneficiary of corporate de-risking strategies,” Abuza said.

Yet the unprecedented political instability of recent months, coupled with a massive financial fraud case that resulted in a former property tycoon being sentenced to death in April, is said to have spooked investors.

Alexander Vuving, a Hanoi-born professor at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Hawaii, said he expects Vietnam’s political turbulence to continue until at least early 2026 when the Communist Party is scheduled to hold its next national congress and elect a new party chief.

Despite recently tightening its grip on civil society, Vuving said Hanoi has not veered closer to China. Instead, Vietnam has stuck to its balanced “bamboo diplomacy” approach, which has also allowed it to preserve good relations with both Russia and the US, and avoid taking sides amid their hostility.

Vietnam and the US elevated their partnership to a “comprehensive strategic” level last year. Meanwhile, Russia remains an important military and energy partner for the Southeast Asia nation, with historical ties dating back to the Soviet era. Hanoi has been reluctant to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, due in part to this long-standing relationship that saw Moscow provide significant support in the years after the Vietnam war ended in 1975.

“Vietnam’s game of thrones will continue,” Vuving said, adding that a reorientation of its foreign policy would only likely be triggered by a transformation of the strategic environment.

“Such a transformation may be China crossing Vietnam’s red lines in the South China Sea or a rapid deterioration of Cambodia-Vietnam relations”, he said. “In both cases, Vietnam is likely to tilt away, not towards China.”

In March, Hanoi objected to China redefining its baseline – the low-tide shoreline used to determine territorial waters – in the Gulf of Tonkin, as the South China Sea waterway between China’s Hainan Island and Vietnam is known internationally.

Beijing said its move in what it calls the Beibu Gulf “strictly complies with domestic laws, international laws and bilateral agreements” and “will not impact Vietnam’s interests or those of any other nation”, according to a foreign ministry statement cited by China’s Global Times tabloid.

Hanoi’s foreign ministry issued a statement later in March saying it “resolutely opposes and rejects” claims that are contrary to international law and violate Vietnam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its territorial waters.

Vietnam’s ties with neighbouring Cambodia have also been strained in recent months by the Funan Techo Canal. Hanoi has voiced concerns about the potential environmental impact of the 180km project, which is aimed at connecting the Mekong River to the coast. However, some analysts believe Vietnam’s anxieties also stem from fears of its declining influence in Cambodia as China’s role in the Mekong region grows.

In recent years, Cambodia has significantly strengthened its political, economic, military and security relationships with China. But given their geographical proximity and shared history, Vietnam has traditionally viewed both Cambodia and Laos as falling within its sphere of influence.