Commentary: Trump’s ‘America First’ may be good for smaller countries

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SINGAPORE: With Donald Trump officially sworn in as America’s 47th president, pundits are predicting American foreign policy will become more unpredictable and messy.

It’s no surprise that Trump’s inaugural speech was directed at the American people – particularly his supporters – and not the international community. Words like “exceptionalism” and “manifest destiny” painted a picture of American might and the ability to wield it against threats at home and abroad.

However, there exists a broad consensus within the United States that a US-led world order has been good for the world, because Washington has seen its interests as synonymous with global ones. Those who espouse this belief may interpret attempts to challenge US dominance not as a threat to America per se, but a threat to the world.

Four observations follow from this.

“AMERICA FIRST” POLICY

First, the overall climate of US-China relations will not change. Both countries have viewed one another with great suspicion and hostility for some time and this is not likely to change, regardless of what their respective leaders do.

Since China’s reopening to the world in 2023 following the pandemic, I have not come across a single Chinese scholar who is optimistic about the future of US-China relations. China under Xi cannot be seen as weak notwithstanding its economic problems, while America’s desire for primacy makes it anxious about countries who do not accept US hegemony as inherently good. 

Second, it is likely that the second Trump administration will take a more instrumental approach to foreign policy. This means extracting maximum concessions from those who want to build good relations with America and wielding a stick to those who challenge Washington’s interests.

After all, Trump was elected by the American people, not by the world. We should not expect the US to pay any price to help anyone, anywhere. Countries who want to get in the good books of Trump would have to demonstrate in a real and tangible manner why America should care about them.

Does Trump care about democracy and other values that Biden talk about? Only to the extent that America benefits from its so-called democratic friends. Is being non-democratic a problem? Not if you chose to acquiesce by American interests and conform to its preferences. Vietnam is an example in Southeast Asia of how this can work out. 

Third, middle powers such as Australia, Japan and South Korea will likely emerge to play more important roles in international affairs, if they are not derailed by domestic challenges. Countries that want to thrive amid geopolitical turbulence need to make decisive contributions at the right moment.

Finally, a quick word of caution on perceived American decline. Whatever we may think about Trump’s policies in the next four years, Trump is effectively in his second and last term. US presidents are effectively constrained by the Constitution, and no single institution (executive, judiciary and legislative) is able to arrogate maximum power to itself.

American institutions and ideals are defined in a manner that will outlast whatever crazy ideas or narrow interests a single leader may have. 

NO MORE FREE-RIDING ON AMERICAN GOODWILL

As a result of Trump’s transactional politics, America will likely demand greater contribution from many countries in defence and security matters. This is not necessarily a bad thing because it gives these countries, particularly smaller ones, the opportunity to show that they are not simply doing things at the behest of the United States.

For instance, if the Philippines and Vietnam decide to increase their defence budgets to strengthen their territorial claims in the South China Sea, it is not because the US is asking them to, but because they do not want to free-ride on America’s security presence in the region.

There is a substantial reservoir of goodwill towards the US in Southeast Asia. In the 2024 State of the Region survey conducted by the ISEAS – Yusof-Ishak Institute, respondents were asked which country the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should choose – the US or China – if it were forced to align itself with one.

For the first time, a majority picked China over the US. However, the margin was paper thin – 50.5 per cent for China to 49.5 per cent for the US, likely due to a swing in Malaysia and Indonesia over American support for Israel in the Gaza war.

That said, the 2024 survey showed that 42.4 per cent of those surveyed were confident or very confident that the US would do the right thing to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance. The figure for China was only 24.8 per cent. 

Seen this way, one can observe that when Southeast Asian countries criticise the US, it is because of a perceived American absence, not because of American presence. In fact, more than 70 per cent of respondents expressed the view that cooperation between ASEAN and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which the US is part of, as being beneficial to the region or complementary with ASEAN’s efforts.

Countries all over the world would need to diversify their partners to ensure that they retain political agency beyond the remit of great power plays. Small countries in particular need to be nimble and deft to find space to act.

While the next four years may be unpredictable to some extent, countries in Asia are much more sanguine about their fortunes only because they have had the experience of Trump’s first administration to take reference from. America putting itself first is hardly surprising, don’t all countries do so? 

Benjamin Ho is an assistant professor at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, specialising in Chinese international relations and comparative political order. He spent time in the United States under a Fulbright scholarship between November 2021 and February 2022.